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Summary findings
The literature on speculative attacks has been given new  Galindo and Maloney test two popular asset-based
impetus by the collapse of the European currency  models of speculative attacks - Krugman and
arrangements beginning in 1992, by the Mexican peso  Rotemberg (1992) and Calvo and Mendoza (1995) -
crisis and after-effects in 1994, and most recently by  especialLy  their emphasis on the second moments of
speculative attacks across Asia.  monetary aggregates.
One strand of this literature stresses the importance of  Analyzing monthly panels of appropriate  countries in
imbalances in stocks of monetary and financial  three regions, they find evidence for the importance of
aggregates rather  than traditional  "flow" factors, arguing  money/reserve ratios predicted by both models, and their
that massive, volatile capital flows have become a  variance as predicted by Calvo and Mendoza.
dominant feature of the global landscape, and that  But the variance of velocity does not appear to be
exchange-rate levels and current accounts have not  important,  casting some doubt on the Krugman-
proved convincing as proximate causes of crises.  Rotemberg target zone framework and the interpretation
of the Calvo-Mendoza results.
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title: Asset  Views of Speculative  Attacks:  Empirical  Evidence.L Introduction
The literature  on speculative  attacks  has been given new impetus by the collapse  of the
European  currency  arrangementsbeginningin  1]992,  theMexicanPeso  crisis  and  aftereffects  in 1994,
and  most recently  by attacks  across  Asia. A comprehensive  review  of  the numerous  approaches  and
findings  to date  is offered  by Kaminsky,  Lizondo,  and Reinhart  (1997).
One strand  of this literature  stresses  the importance  of imbalances  in stocks  of monetary  and
financial  aggregates  rather than  traditional  "flow"  factors,  arguing  that massive  and  volatile  capital
flows  have become  a dominant  feature  of  the global  landscape,  and exchange  rate levels and current
accounts  have not proved convincing  as proximate  causes  of crises (see, for example, Calvo and
Mendoza, 1995).  The earliest  genre of these model dates from Salant  and Henderson (1978) and
Krugman  (1979) and have  been  further  elaborated  by Flood  and  Garber  (1984)  and Obstfeld  (1986)
among  others.  In most,  a persistent  and  monetized  budget  deficit  leads  to an offsetting  fall in reserves.
Forward looking  investors,  anticipating  the eventual  abandonment  of the peg, attack the currency
when  the  remaining  stock  of reserves  equals  the idecline  in domestic  money  demanded  that  will occur
when the currency  floats. This provides  a rationale  for the inclusion  of ratio of reserves  to money
(Bilson  1979,  Edwards  1989,  Kaminsky  and Reiinhart  1996,  Klein and  Marion 1994,  Sachs,  Tomell
and Velasco 1996)  rather  than the more  traditional  scaling  by imports (see for example,  Edin and
Vredi, 1993,  Frankel  and  Rose, 1996)  or GDP  (Collins  1995)  and  the inclusion  of the rate of growth
of domestic  credit (Edwards, 1989,  Frankel  and Rose, 1996).
However, as Calvo and Mendoza  note, in the Mexican  case,  the apparent  fiscal surplus  in
1993  appears  to contradict  this type of speculative  attack  model. They  argue  that the focus should
rather be on the stochastic  evolution  of demand  for monetary  aggregates,  particularly  M2. Demand
1for domestic  assets by foreign  capital  or for private  expenditure  can suddenly  evaporate  leaving  the
monetary  authorities  the choice  of  using sterilized  intervention  andweakeningthe  currency,  or risking
the collapse  of a weak  banking  system.  Noting  that the log of the ratio of  M2 to reserves  appears  to
follow a random walk Calvo argues  that its higher  volatility in Mexico  raises  the probability  of
wandering  into crisis above  what it would  be in Austria  with a comparable  reserve  ratio.
However,  the Calvo-Mendoza  view shares  a closer  kinship  with  the literature  on target  zones
beginning  with  Williamson  (1985),  Frenkel  and  Goldstein  (1986),  and  Krugman  (1991),  than  with  the
domestic  credit driven models  that they critique.  Krugman  and Rotemberg  (1992) developed  the
theoretical  bridge to the speculative  attack  literature  and derive  the specific  conditions  under  which
a band cannot be defended  and a crisis may be expected.' The target zone framework  is more
appropriate  to both the European  case and  the major  Latin American  countries  in the 1990's  which
were more often  than not managing  their exchange  rates  within a band.  It is also  rich in predictions
about  the role of reserve  to money  ratios  and  the second  moments  of monetary  variables  in generating
crises.
Despite the popularity  of both these views,  to date there has been no systematic  testing of
their predictions  and  particularly  about  the importance  of the volatility  of monetary  aggregates.  This
paper  attempts  to do so and  finds  only partial  support. Beginning  with the target  zone  literature,  we
generate  a set of testable  specifications  and show  their  broad similarity  to the Calvo  Mendoza  view.
We compile  a data set  focused  on a sample  of countries  in the late 1980s  and 1990s  whose exchange
rate arrangements  and capital  account  regulations  are appropriate  to the model. We then employ
'Edin  and Vredin  (1993)  and Otker  and Pazarba§ioglu  (1994)also  analyze  attacks  on
target  zones but with in a very different  framework  that does not yield  predictions  about second
moments.
2panel estimators  that preserve the temporal dimension often lost in previous studies that pool
observations. We then test the predictions of both the target zone and the Calvo-Mendoza
framework.
We tightly restrict  the number  of variables  included  in the regressions.  This is primarily
because  our goal is to test the importance  of a few heretofore  unexamined  variables,  rather than to
predict crises per se.  However,  it is also the case  that the choice to work over a relatively  short
interval  at  high frequency  necessarily  implies  that  many  of the  variables  that  have  appeared  important
in other  studies  are  unavailable  for many or all the countries  in the sample  at the required  frequency.
L  Theoretical  Background  from  the Target  Zone  Literature
In the Krugman-Rotemberg  framework,  the nominal  exchange  rate is assumed  to follow  a
simple,  although  standard,  log linear  monetary  model  of the exchange  rate
s  = m + V +  l7E[ds]
where s is the log of the spot exchange rate, m the log of domestic  money supply,  v a shift  term
capturing  shocks  to money demand  including  those  to real income,  velocity  etc.,  and the expected
rate of depreciation  times ,A the interest  semi-elasticity  of money  demand.  The term  v is assumed  to
evolve  as a random  walk with drift:
dv = udt + adz  (2)
where z is a wiener process:  dz-IN(O,l),  and p is the rate of drift.  Money  supply  is assumed  to be
3passive  and altered  only to keep the exchange  rate within the target zone.  As the exchange  rate
moves  toward the end of the band, intervention  by the central  bank reduces  the money supply  to
maintain  s in bounds  and the smooth  pasting  equilibrium  holds.  However,  as in the earlier  literature,
an attack  will occur  if the stock  of reserves  is eroded  to where  it equals  the decline  in the demand  for
money  that would  result  from the collapse. Krugnan and  Rotemberg  show  this quantity
M/  - m  =  (3)
where
X  - 2u +/~~  al2,u  2a  (4)
)702
This implies  that an attack occurs  when
K  <  I  -e  T/  5
D+R
The  threshold  ratio of reserves  to high  powered  money  below  which  an attack  occurs,  t,  is a function
of  7,  ,u, and o.  An increase  in the drift or the variance of the shocks  to money demand,  or an
increase  in the sensitivity  of money  demand,  expected  depreciation,  through  the interest  rate lowers
the threshold. The difference  between  the first and second  elements  above  can be seen as an index
of proximity  to the threshold  that holds the promise  of being a useful  predictor  of attacks.
Scaling  the threshold  by the money  multiplier,  equation  (5) is broadly  consistent  with Calvo'  s
focus on the log of M2 over reserves  converted  into domestic  currency  and its variance,  rather  than
4that of velocity. The two measures  of varian,ce  diverge  to the degree  that purchasing  power  parity
fails  and  reserves  are not  proportional  to incom  e. In  the estimations  that  follow,  we first  test explicitly
the Krugman-Rotemberg  specification,  and then  the Calvo  hypothesis.
IIL Estimation
We construct  panels  of up to nine years  of monthly  data  for 14 countries.  We choose  this
frequency  first because  it seems  appropriate  given  the  rapidity  with  which  fundamentals  can change.
- -Second,  it generates  enough degrees  of freedom  to permit  focusing  on a restricted  period, 1987-
1995,  which corresponds  reasonably  well to ithe  assumptions  of the model:  high degrees  of short
term capital  flows, reasonably  open  economies,  and authorities  committed  to maintaining  a target
zone or, in the limit, a peg as determined  by the IMF publication,  Exchange  Arrangements  and
Exchange  Restrictions.  The downside  of this approach  is that the availability  of indicators  at this
frequency  sharply  restricts  the range  of countries  that can  be included,  and  the span  of data  available.
This is especially  the case for Asia  where only Korea and  Malaysia  publish  industrial  production
numbers,  the only  feasible  proxy  forthe output  variable  required  to calculate  velocity  and  to estimate
interest elasticities.  Since the latter  managed  a target  zone  for only a brief period,  we exclude  the
Asian region from this part of the work and do not include  the1997 crises. In total, our sample
includes nine European countries  -Austria,  Denmark,  France, Italy, Holland, Finland,  Ireland,
Portugal  and Spain-  and  five  Latin  American  countries  -Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Mexico,  Argentina
-for  which  equation  (5) can  be tested  directly.  Since  the Calvo-Mendoza  hypothesis  does  not  require
output  measures  to calculate  relevant  variables,  in the second  section  we can employ  a much  broader
range  of countries  however,  to remain  comparable  with the first section,  again,  we do not address
5the most recent  crises.
We generate  an index of speculative  pressure  similar  to that of Eichengreen  and  Wyplosz
(1995). Reserve  movements  and real exchange  rate are standardized  by their standard  deviations
and combined.  As in Sachs,  Tomell, and Velasco,  and  Kaminsky,  Lizondo  and Reinhart,  interest
rates were not included in the index due to sharp movements  in Latin America that are often
unrelated  to attacks.
The results  we present  are those leaving  the index  as a continuous  measure.  The literature
frequently  discusses  the incidence  of "speculative  pressure"  that often  falls short of a full blown
attack (see Svensson,  1994). Such episodes,  though falling below whatever  arbitrary cut off is
employed  to define  a discrete  "crisis"  are arguably  driven  by similar  dynamics.  It may  therefore  be
inefficient  to discard this information,  create a dichotomous  variable, and then employ limited
dependent  variable  techniques  to infer  the determinants  of  the underlying  continuous  latent  variable.
On the other hand all measures  that weight  innovations  by the country-specific  standard  deviation
treat a one standard deviation  of the index as equally  important  episodes  of speculative  pressure,
whether  in Austria or Mexico. This is defendable  to the degree  that countries  differ in  "normal"
movements  in reserves  or exchange  rates,  and  hence  also  in what should  be considered  a crisis. But
as an altemative,  we also create a binary crisis  index informed  by movements  in the index,  but
modified  by what the literature  recognizes  as  legitimate  speculative  attacks.  All  the analysis  was run
using this variable  both with the complete  sample,  and truncating  each country  series  immediately
after a crisis  to focus on the run-up  to each  event.  However,  perhaps  due  to the limited  number  of
crises  relative  to observations,  no specification  appeared  remotely  significant  and we do not report
the results.
6The series  forthe variance  and  trend  in velocity  movements  are  generated  in two  ways. First,
individual  GARCH  models were fit for each of the 14 countries.  The trend was derived as the
forecast of a time series  model  for the log of velocity  of general  form: 2
Alog(v)=aO+ajIog(v, _)+  +  a,log(v,,)+E,  (6)
i=1
As conventional,  we assumed  that  the error term is normally  distributed  with mean zero and
variance h 1 , where
p
ht=yo+E Y2  e  t  PA  (7)
i=l  =
For every country,  an acceptable  individual  specifications  was generated  that removed  residual
GARCH  effects,  usually  with a GARCH(1,1)  specification  or a ARCH(1). Second,  to provide  a
smoother  alternative  under  the assumption  that longer  term volatility  may enter speculators'
decisions,  we construct  a six month  rolling  variance  of A log(v)  and use its six month moving
average  for the trend.
To generate  a consistent  set of interest  semi-elasticities,  a simple  model  of MI in first
differences  was estimated  using two stage  least squares. In all cases,  the coefficient  on money
was of the correct  sign, and almost  always  significant. Since  the available  interest  rates are
implicitly  those  paid on assets often  included  in M2, the estimated  semi-elasticities  using  this
2  a more general  discussion  of GARC'H  models  see  Bollerslev,  Engle and  Nelson
(1993).  The inclusion  of a "levels"  effect  in the mean equation  is now common  in estimations  of
continuous  time stochastic  volatility  models. See,  for example,  Andersen  and Lund (1997)  for an
application  to short term interest  rates.
7aggregate  were,  unsurprisingly,  very often  positive.  In the absence  of data on returns on less
liquid assets,  this means  the specification  can only be run with M1.3 Since  we are concerned  only
with the direct effect  of depreciation  on money  demand  through  the interest  rates, cointegration
based estimation  methods  were not appropriate  since  they generate  the total impact  elasticity
through  all variables  in the system. 4 Although  the literature  on estimating  interest  response  of
money  demand  is long and contentious,  as we will see, the precision  of these estimates  does not
appear  critical  to the results.  The threshold  value is scaled  by the money  multiplier,  so as to make
it consistent  with the ratio of reserves  to Ml, rather than  base money.
Finally,  unlike  the European  subsample,  the Latin American  countries  adopted  a target
zone or peg at different  times within our sample  period. Further,  in the case  of Argentina,  the
deceleration  of inflation  in the early part of the stabilization  plan introduced  a high degree  of both
real exchange  variance,  interest  rates and other  variables  that was unrelated  to the sustainability
of the peg per se. We therefore  begin  the sample  in 1992:1  when inflation  was falling  to levels
below 50%. The effect  in both cases  is to generate  an unbalanced  panel.
As a preliminary  test of the model,  table la presents  the thresholds  calculated  first using
the GARCH  and  then the moving  average  specifications  of the variance,  as well as the level of
RIMl for the entire  sample,  and  table lb the same  information  for several  countries  experiencing
crises  in both Europe and  Latin America.  As is immediately  evident,  on average,  the reserve  ratio
3 This also raises  questions  about  the interpretation  of the interest  rate coefficient  in
empirical  tests of monetarist  models  of the exchange  rate  that employ  M2, and use these same
interest rates as the opportunity  cost of holding  it. Estimates  available  on request.
4 Johansen(1995)  and Lutkepol  (1994)  argue  that the coefficient  from cointegrating
regressions  cannot  be interpreted  as the necessary  partial  elasticities  since  they  capture  shocks
transmitted  through  all other  variables  and cannot  be allowed  a ceterisparibus  interpretation.
8is far above  the threshold  and that, even  at theiir  maxima,  these thresholds  are very low.  In the
months before  crises,  only in the case  of Italy was  the reserve  to Ml ratio remotely  close  to
either  threshold. In general, a strict interpretation  of equation  (5) would  imply thresholds  that
tend to be so low that we should  virtually  never  see a crisis.
One possible  conclusion  might be that ihis arises  from the inaccuracy  of our estimates  of
the elements  of equation(5). However,  figure I shows  the value of the threshold  to be very
insensitive  to even  large movements  around  our estimates.'  First, since  velocity  series  are either
I(1) or I(0), differencing  them leaves  them stationary  and, not unexpectedly,  with essentially  no
drift, u.  Very large increases  would be needed  to raise  t  to .1 even at values of  o2 an order of
magnitude  greater  than the maxima  observed. 6 Given  the relatively  standard  tools employed,  it
seems  unlikely  that our estimates  are off by these  magnitudes.  At current  levels of o9  and u,
even  large differences  in the interest  semi-elasticity  have  very little effect.  Again,  since our
estimates  are of similar  orders  of magnitude  to those  found elsewhere,  this is unlikely  to be the
problem. Given  reasonable  values for the arguments  involved,  the literal application  of this
model  is unlikely  to generate  crises  at the reserre  ratios  generally  observed.
This,  of course,  is not in itself evidence  against  the target  zone framework  more generally
for analyzing  speculative  attacks. The Krugman-Rotemberg  model is admittedly  heuristic  in
intent and departs  from a simple  monetary  model  of the exchange  rate that has persistently
resisted  empirical  verification. Nonetheless,  it is not unreasonable  to expect  that the arguments
5  The average  multiplier  for the sample  is used  to scale  the threshold.
6In  an earlier  application  to Colombia,  Mlexico  and Germany,  Carasquilla  (1995)  found
much higher  thresholds. This was due, however,  to unusually  high estimates  of the drift  term.
9in eq (5) appear  in some  form among  the determinants  of currency  crises. Our estimation
strategy  is therefore  first to take the model  literally,  and then progressively  to loosen  the
constraints  on the underlying  arguments  until the final  regression  is
n
trsue  =  fo  E  [pR  R  +  +pg  +  n Pressure,  =p+E  sM, im  M1i  +  _ii  +  pa,iCytji  n  8
Table  2 presents  the results  of these  regressions. Columns  la and lb present  the specification
with only the proximity  to the threshold  index calculated  using  the GARCH  estimates  of the
variance  and drift, and the moving  average  estimates  respectively.  Columns  2a and 2b allow
R/MI and 'r to enter separately,  again calculating  the latter  using the two separate  measures  of
variance  and drift. Columns  3a and  b estimate  (8) above,  unconstraining  the arguments  in  r.
The results offer only partial support  to the model. Standard  Hausman  and Breusch  -
Pagan tests dictate  using either  pooled  or variable  effects  estimators,  depending  on the
subsample.  In each case,  an equal number  of lags for all variables  were included  and the lag
structure  was pared down  to where the last set of lags was insignificant.  Contemporaneous
values  were excluded  since  in a crisis situation,  we would  expect  a large shock to reserves  would
be reflected  in RIM1.  In virtually  all cases,  only two lagged  sets of variables  were significant.  The
sum of the coefficients  are reported  and the probability  value of the F-tests on their  joint
significance  below.
Virtually  all specifications  show  F or X 2tests on the overall  significance  of the regression
significant  below  the 8% level and for Europe  and the overall  sample,  below  the 5% level. In all
cases,  the proximity  to the threshold  index enters  with the anticipated  sign,  and significantly,
10regardless  of the variance  and drift  measures  employed.  Of concern,  however,  is that when the
index is broken  into the asset ratio and the threshold,  r, the latter enters with the predicted  sign
in the European  sample,  but is significant  only  ifor  the GARCH  specification  at the 10%  level.
The reserve  ratio, on the other  hand,  emerges  of the predicted  sign and very high  levels of
significance  in virtally  all specifications.  This suggests  that  to the degree  that  the index  was
significant,  it was driven  largely  by the reserve  ratio.
Disaggregating  rinto its component  parts,  the drift  term,  A enters  with correct sign  and
significantly  at the 10%  level in the GARCH  specifications  for the European  and the complete
samples,  but insignificantly  or of the wrong sign  for all other  specifications.  The oa  terms, are
also of the anticipated  sign in roughly  half the specifications  and enter at the 11-13%  level only in
the European  specifications,  as with drift,  with  the correct  sign.  The semi-elasticity  of money
demand  also shows  unstable  signs  and never  enters  significantly. In sum,  the only specifications
for which  the variance  and drift  terms  enter consistently  with  the model  and of some  significance
are the European  specifications.  However,  these are also  the only specifications  for which  the
asset ratios enter  with the wrong sign.  When the semi-elasticity  is dropped  from  the regression,
the sign reverses  to that anticipated  although  both drift  and variance  terms become  slightly  with
the latter  now significant  at the 15%  level only.  The other  regressions  largely  unaffected  (results
available  on request).
The highest  level of explanatory  power,  as measured  by the R2 is for Latin  America,  at
only 7.2% of the variance  explained. Further,  to remove  the possibility  that the estimates  of
interest  elasticities  were driving  the aggregated  specifications,  they  were also  run with a common
value of .1. However,  consistent  with  the discussion  above, this had essentially  no impact  on the
11results.
IV. Test of the Calvo-Mendoza  View with  an Expanded  Sample
Calvo and  Mendoza  argue that ln(R/M2)  and its variance  should  appear  as important  in
determining  speculative  attacks.  Since  we no longer  calculate  velocity  or estimate semi-
elasticities,  we do not need measures  of economic  activity  and the sample  can be expanded  to
include  countries  previous  dropped  for lack of data. The sample  now includes  four Asian
countries-  Indonesia,  Korea,  Malaysia,  and Thailand.  We also group  in this category,  "Asia+,"
Israel which,  while clearly  not sufficient  as a category  of its own, is an important  case study for
target zones. 7 To the five existing  Latin  American  countries  we add  Uruguay  and to Europe  we
add Greece  and the UK and Sweden  for the M2 regressions.  The African  countries  in the Franc
zone were not included  despite  their long-standing  peg to the French  currency  since capital  flows
remain largely  restricted. We employ  the moving  average  representation  of the variance rather
than estimate  24 individual  GARCH  specifications.
Table  3 presents  the ratio of reserves  to M2, its log, and the standard  deviations  of the
latter across  the sample  period employed  in the regressions.  Figure  2 presents  the evolution  of
these variables  across  a longer period  for a selection  of countries. What is immediately  clear
from both is that geographical  generalizations  are not robust.  As Calvo  points  out, Mexico does
have a much higher  variance  of R/M2 relative  to Austria,  and this may  offset  the fact that it has a
higher reserve  to M2 ratio.  But the other  two  Latin countries  hit in 1994-95,  Argentina  and
7Williamson  (1996)  has a detailed  analysis  of the crawling  bands  of Chile,  Colombia  and
Israel.
12Brazil  have roughly  the same  degree  of volatility  as, and significantly  higher  reserve  ratios  than
Austria,  as well as every  Asian country  with the exception  of Malaysia. At the time of the
Tequila  crisis,  Colombia  and Chile  had levels  of variance  similar  to those  of Austria.  Overall,
volatility  in Latin  America  would  be difficult  to distinguish  from  Europe  and reserve  ratios  are,
on average,  higher.
It is true that, in table 3, the moderate  Latin American  volatility  arises  partially  from
having  dropped  the high inflation  periods  in Argentina,  Brazil  and  Mexico.  We defend  this on
two grounds. First, it can be argued  that these  are unusual  periods  and thus do not share  the
same  data generation  process  as the other  countries  in the panel.  Second,  the variances  across
these periods  dwarf the relatively small  rises around  the tequila  period  and  in preliminary
regressions  tended  to generate  the inverse  correlation  with crises from that predicted.  These
high variances  may be "real" but they  may  possibly  arise  if large  increases  in money  supply,  and
the expected  proportional  depreciation  of the cutrrency  are not coincident.
Figure 2 suggests  some  support  for the ('alvo-Mendoza  hypothesis.  Chile,  Colombia  and
Uruguay,  countries  largely  unaffected  in the Tequila  episode,  had extremely  low variances  across
this period  while Brazil  and Mexico,  with relatively  high reserve  ratios, showed  rises in their
variances  in the early part of 1994  to among  the highest  levels  in the sample. On the other  hand,
Italy and Spain  at the end of the 1994  showed  comparable  levels  of variance  but with much
lower  reserve ratios  and yet experienced  no crisis  while  Argentina  showed  low  variance  and
relatively  high reserves  and  was still  hit.
Table 4 presents  the results  of regressing;  the pressure  index  on the log of reserve  ratios
and their variance.  For comparison  with the previous  section,  we begin  working  with MI. F-tests
13suggest  6 lags of the two variables. As before,  the asset  ratio is significant  for the entire  sample,
and  Europe  and for Latin America  at the 7% level.  However,  the variance  is now significant  for
the whole sample,  Europe,  and Latin  America  although  it enters  with incorrect  sign in the latter
and in Asia+.  The variables  taken  together  are statistically  significant  for all except  the Asia+
regression,  although  again,  the overall  explanatory  power  is under 5% of the variance.
The results  improve  if we work  with R/M2 as suggested  by Calvo and Mendoza.  The
sample  size increases  for Europe  because  Sweden  publishes  M2 and the U.K. publishes  a proxy
for M2 (the retail  component  of M4) but neither  publish  MI.  RIM2  is of the predicted  sign for
all but Asia+  although  it is now not significant  within  Latin  America. The variance  is very
significant  and of the correct  sign  for all except  Asia+. Again,  all the regressions,  with the
exception  of Asia+ are very significant.
The poor performance  of the model  for Asia+  may results  from two factors. First, since
in none of the countries  was there a true speculative  attack across  the sample  period,  the
movements  in the standardized  index may  represent  noise  unrelated  to speculative  pressure.
Moderate  depreciations  designed  to preserve  competitiveness  in Korea, or Israel will get very
large  weight,  yet occur in relatively  healthy  macro-environments.  The fact that the model
predicts  so poorly in this case may  be considered  support  for it overall. It also suggests  that, for
the other  regions,  the index  is not  just picking  up noise. It may also  be, however,  that despite  the
loosening  of capital  controls  over time, some  countries,  like Korea, still  managed  short  term
flows and therefore  do not correspond  well  to the model.
The fact that the variance  now enters  with the correct  sign in the  Latin subsample  is
supportive  of the variance  of M2IR  being  the more  appropriate  of the two monetary  aggregates.
14The explanatory  power  also increases  in every  case  except  Asia+. This raises  the question  of
whether  the relative  success  of the Calvo-Mendoza  model  compared  to the Krugman-Rotemberg
model  is solely  due to using M2 rather than  Ml, As empirical  studies  of monetary  models  of the
exchange  rate  frequently  employ  M2, this might  have  been a more  desirable  aggregate  to employ
in section  m were it not for the unavailability  of corresponding  interest  elasticities. As an
alternate  test, in table 5 we present  the results  of a specification  analogous  to that of Calvo-
Mendoza,  where  the variance  of RIM2 is replaced  by the  variance  of the inverse  of velocity,
PY/M2. As in the more complete  regressions  using  Ml, the results  are not supportive  of the
Krugman-Rotemberg  specification:  the variance  of the velocity  does  not enter significantly  in any
regression  and the signs  are the opposite  of those  predicted  in both  the overall  and European
regressions.
This finding  provokes  some second  thoughts  about  the more  successful  Calvo-Mendoza
approach  as well. The shocks  to broad  money  demand  that it postulates  as critical  to bringing  on
crises  should  presumably  also show  up in the variance  of velocity  yielding  similar  empirical
findings. The fact  that they do not raises  the question  of what  is driving  the significance  of the
variance  of RRM2,  the variance  of M2, or of reserves.  This is not  necessarily  bad news. Finding
that the second  moment  of reserves  helps  predict  crises  is still  useful  information  for policy
makers  even if not entirely  in line with the formal  motivation  in terms of shocks  to M2. A
possible  concem  is that if in the run up to a crisis,  reserve  losses  become  progressively  larger,
this may show  up both in the pressure indicator,  that has as one  component  the change  in
reserves,  as well as in lags of the variance  of M2/R. Attempting  to eliminate  this problem  by
running  a probit  with the binary crisis index  capturing  recognized  attacks,  as in section  II,
15jyielded insignificant results. However, as before, this may be due to the few crises relative to
observations.
Conclusions:
The paper provides some evidence in favor of an asset view of speculative attacks and
the importance of the second moments of monetary aggregates in predicting crises.  In the
regressions for both the Krugman- Rotemberg target zone model and the Calvo-Mendoza
approach, the stock of money relative to reserves appears very significant and of the predicted
sign in most specifications. The results for the drift and variance terms for the innovations in
velocity are less consistently supportive of the first model with only the GARCH specifications
for Europe and the overall sample generating the predicted signs and borderline significance.
These results cannot be seen as strong evidence in favor of the target zone framework or as
offering much confidence in the elusive measure of proximity to crisis that it theoretically offers.
The variance of reserves to the money aggregates suggested by the Calvo-Mendoza approach,
however interpreted,  appears more significantly and may contribute additional explanatory
power to models seeking to predict crises.
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Appendix I: Data
MO:  All from line 14 of IFS statistics  except:  Italy 1995  from Banca  D'Italia, Economic  Bulletin,
Number  22, Feb 1996.Colombia,  Banco de la Republica.
MI: line 34 IFS or, if unavailable,  Ml. Colombia,  Banco  de la  Repuiblica.  Not available  for U.K.
or Sweden.
M2: line 34 + line 35 quasi  money,  IFS. VK:  Building  Societies  pay interest  on demand  deposits.
In 1989,  some  became  banks. Bank  of England  continued  calculating  Ml without  new banks
18until 1990.  Then stopped.  M2 is the retail component  of M4, The Bank of England suggested  the
omitting  very large depositors  who  had some  market  power  and who  were unlikely  to be using
M4 for transactions  purposes  was the correct  measure.  1987-1994  from Bank of England,
Statistical  Abstract, 1995  part 2 Detailed  monetary  statistics.  1995  values provided  by the Bank
of England.  Colombia,  Banco  de la Republica.
Money multipliers:  Ratios of MI to Base money'.  Chile,  Boletin  Mensual,  Banco Central  de
Chile.
Industrial  Production:  All from line 66 of IFC except:  Portugal:  June 1994-  Boletim  Mensal de
Estadistica,  Instituto  Nacional  de Estatistica,  Bank of Portugal;  Chile,  Boletin Mensual,  Banco
Central  de Chile;  Colombia,  Banco de la Repuibliica,  Brazil,  Banco Garantia;  Argentina;
Real Exchange  Rate: IFS line  reu or rec. For Latin  America,  EP*/P  where P* is weighted
average  of the WPI of the principal  commercial  partners  of each country.  US WPI.
Interest rates: IFS line 601  or closest  market  determined  rate. Argentina,  Informe  Econ6mico,
Ministerio  de Economia  y Obras  y Servicios  Nblicos.
Our  thanks for essential  help  collecting  data  to: I)avid Willoughby,  Bank  of England,  Charles
Goodhart,  LSE for the UK; Hemando  Vargas,  Banco de la  Republica,  Colombia;  Jose Guerra,
Cental Bank of Venezuela;  Rodrigo  Azevedo,  Banco Garantia,  Brazil;  Ricardo  Bebzuk  and Abel
Viglione,  Argentina.
Appendix  II: Countries  and Sample  Periods
Asia: Israel 1987:1-95:12,Indonesia  1987:1-95:12,  Korea 1988:12-1995:12;  Malaysia 1987:1-
1988:12.
Europe:  Austria,  Denmark,  France,  Italy,  Holland, Finland,  Greece,  Ireland,  Portugal,  Spain,
Sweden,  UK; all 1987:  1-1995:12
Latin  America:  Argentina  1992:01-95:12;  Brazil 1994:07-95:12;  Chile 1987:1-95:12;  Colombia
1987:1-95:12;  Mexico 1991:11-95:12;  Uruguay  1990:12-95:12.
19Table la:  Complete Sample Summary Statistics
_Mean  S.D.  Max  Min
Pressure Index  -0.000  0.025  0.444  -0.319
'T1  0.016  0.022  0.212  0.000
T2  0.019  0.021  0.169  0.001
R/M1  0.706  0.710  3.562  0.054
Ca 21  0.003  0.005  0.042  0.000
III  -0.004  0.056  0.369  -0.249
(e2  0.007  0.015  0.180  0.000
p2  -0.002  0.023  0.070  -0.190
fn  0.684  0.688  2.010  0.069
Notes:  ti =tbreshold,  ai =variance  of innovations,  .i=  drift using  GARCH.
¶Z  2,  2 using  moving  average.  RIMl = resrves in domestic  Currency
divided  by  narrow  money.  Tj = semi-elasticity  of money  demand.
Table lb: Thresholds and Reserve Ratios for
Selected  Speculative Attacks
Country  Crisis -1  ¶1  T2  R/Mi
Argentina  1994:11  0.036  0.036  0.885
BraZil  1994:11  0.072  0.024  1.658
Mexico  1994:11  0.010  0.007  0.322
Finland  1992:08  0.009  0.001  0.165
Italy  1992:08  0.031  0.012  0.054
Spain  1992:08  0.023  0.014  0.382
Portugal  1992:08  0.011  0.010  1.146
Spain  1992:10  0.034  0.015  0.356
Portugal  1992:10  0.014  0.017  0.947
Spain  1993:04  0.025  0.031  0.299
Portugal  1993:04  0.018  0.015  0.828
Spain  1993:06  0.004  0.032  0.323
Portugal  1993:06  0.010  0.015  0.826
France  1993:06  0.001  0.002  0.119
Notes: Ti  = threshold  using  GARCH,  I  using  moving  average.  Crisis-1l
month  before  crisis.Table 2: Determinants of Speculative Attacks on Target Zones, 1987-1995
________  ~~~~ALL  EUROPE  - IATIN  AMERICA  - -
_la  lb  2a  2b  3a  3b  Ia  lb  2a  2b  3a  3b  la  lb  2a  2b  3a  3b
Index 1 E-03  -4.37  -0.302  -7.82
0.000  0.014  0.000
Index2  E-03  4.28  -0.243  -7.87
0.000  0.047  0.000
R/M I E-03  4.26  -2.70  -4.56  4.23  -0.788  -0.674  0.35  0.375  -7.44  -5.38  -7.31  -3.75
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.035  0.039  0.041  0.028  0.000  0.010  0.000  0.007
Ti E-02  -0.613  8.15  -6.4
0.366  0.100  0.664
-C2E-02  -8.61  4.48  -14.8
0.082  0.697  0.287
iti E-02  1.41  3.85  -0.63
0.070  0.066  10.218
12 13-02  -3.56  0.73  -1.88
0.010  0.438  0.337
aI  E-01  1.21  2.09  -5.22
0.638  0.109  0.840
02  L-Ui  -0.117  0.863  -5.75
0.667  0.128  0.267
ij  E-04  -1.2  -2.96  5.89  4.7  6.33  -7.840
0.915  0.785  0.420  0.5  0.144  0.874
constantE-03  2.78  2.770  2.87  3.37  2.71  2.97  0.721  0.691  0.076  0.322  -0.405  -0.326  9.310  9.310  11.2  11.90  10.90  10.50
0.007  0.007  0.008  0.002  0.066  0.027  0.498  0.512  0.951  0.813  0.723  0.762  0.088  0.090  0.068, 0.040  0.144 I 0.126
R  0.045  0.041  0.043  0.046  0.044  0.047  0.010  0.010  0.012  0.010  0.017  0.017  0.054  0.050  0.048  0.054  0.072  0.059
Obs  1091  1091  1091  1091  1091  1091  828  828  828  828  828  828  263  263  263  263  263  1  263
OverallSignif.  26.59  24.65  13.29  14.08  8.16  8.67  8.47  6.13  11.04  7.24  14.14  14.79  8.40  7.96  4.32  4.77  2.83  3.33
P value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.015  0.047  0.026  0.124  0.048  0.039  0.000  0.00  0.002  0.001  0.007  0.002
Notes:  Results are the sunmation  of the estimated parameters  of the first two lags of the variables and beneath them,  the P-value of tests under the null hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly equal to zero.
Specification 'a'  uses the GARCH estimates of the vaiance and drift while specification "b" employs a six month moving average. Tau is the threshold  level of RA41 at which an attack would be expected.
The sample size is 1987:1- 1995:12 for Europe while those for Latin  Ametica depend on the individual country ( See appendix II).  The complete sample  and Latin  American models are pooled regressions while the
European specification  employs a randorn Effects estimator as dictated by lausman  and Breusch-Pagan tests. F tsts  for the pooled regressions and Chi squared tests for the random effects estimators were used to
evaluate the significance ofthe estimated  parameters and of the averal  rgession.Table  3: Sample  Means and Standard  Deviations
S.D.
Country  RIM2  L~o(R/M21)  Log(!oR!)
Europe
Austria  0.08  -2.57  0.16
Denmark  0.12  -2.12  0.23
Finland  0.12  -2.14  0.22
France  0.06  -2.83  0.16
Greece  0.15  -2.04  0.51
Ireland  0.28  -1.28  0.21
Italy  0.07  -2.67  0.31
Netherlands  0.09  -2.43  0.21
Portugal  0.26  -1.42  0.36
Spain  0.13  -2.06  0.22
Sweden  0.17  -1.82  0.39
United Kingdom  0.07  -2.62  0.17
Latin America
Argentina  0.27  -1.31  0.14
Brazil  0.24  -1.44  0.18
Chile  0.50  -0.74  0.27
Colombia  0.45  -0.84  0.25
Mexico  0.20  -1.67  0.32
Uruguay  0.14  -2.05  0.33
Other
Israel  0.16  -1.82  0.19
Indonesia  0.18  -1.73  0.19
Korea  0.16  -1.85  0.14
Malaysia  0.30  -1.20  0.09
Thailand  0.22  -1.52  0.23
Notes: moments  correspond  to sanple period used in estimations
(See appendix  2).Table  4:  Tests of the Calvo-Mendoza  Hypothesis,1987-1995
Sample:  All  Europe  Latin  Asia+
I America  _
M1
Log(R/Ml) E-03  -2.03  -0.439  -17.0  -2.04
0,004  0.039  0.070  0.478
VJLog(RIMI)]  E-02  4.77  11.2  -3.76  -10.8
0.003  0.000  0.001  0.646
Constant E-03  -0.258  -1.05  -6.41  -0.649
0.001  0.142  0.106  0.446
R2  0.018  0.049  0.080  0.000
Observations  1  577  960  232  289
Overall Significance  3.39  49.06  2.67  0.69
0.000  0 000  0.002  0.763
M2
Log(RlM2) E-03  -2.47  -0.764  -3.16  0.044
0.0)01  0.037  0.150  0.894
V[Log(R/MZ)J  E-02  7,43  15.4  13.7  -1.82
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.591
Constant E-03  -5.99  -2.19  -12.1  4.29
0.004  0.177  0.220  0.530
Ri  0.029  0.061  0.111  0.000
Observations  1769  1152  232  289
Overall Significance  5.38  74.34  3.41  0.55
___________________________  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.879
Notes: We report the summation of the fust six I  of each variable  and below it the P-Value ofthe test under
the null that  the coefEicients  an jointly equal to zero. All models are estimated as pooled mgressions  except  the
European ones where Hausman and Breusch-Pagan  tests dictated a random effet  model. F-tests for the pooled
and Chi squared for the random effects  regiessions were used  to evaluate  the overall  significance of  the specification.Table  5: Test of Simplified Krugman  Model, 1987-1995
(Calvo-Mendoza  with variance  of velocity)
Sample:  All  Europe  Latin
.I  Ameiica
M2
Log(RlM2)  E-03  -3.35  -0.732  -6.75
0.000  0.001  0.044
V[(YP)/M21  E-02  -2.38  -2.89  31.8
0.689  0.188  0.837
Constant E-03  -6.99  -0.622  -1.54
0.003  0.736  0.207
R2 0.028  0.030  0.056
Observations  1192  960  232
Overall Significance  3.24  2.72  1.34
_______________________  0.000  _0.001  0.198
Notes:  We report the sumnmation  of the first six lags of each variable  and below it the P-value
of the test under the null that the coefficients  are jointly equal to zero. All models estimated
are estimated as pooled regressions. F tests were used  to evaluate  the overall significance  of the
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